Þjóðverjar vilja "ræða vísindalega áætlun um útflutning á atvinnulausu fólki"

Wall Street Journal - föstudaginn 25. september 1931

Premier Laval will reportedly discuss with German officials "a scientific plan of emigration to cure Europe's unemployment problem." Noting that before the war Europe exported 2M-3M emigrants annually but since the war the US, Canada, Australia and Asia have closed their doors, the plan will propose studying "diverting surplus population to the African colonies and South America under sound economic conditions.

Dow: 107.79 -8.20 (7.1%)

Krækja 

Friday, September 25, 1931

Fyrri færsla

Evra ESB og ASÍ: Laun lækka áfram í Þýskalandi og gufa upp á Spáni 

Athugasemdir

[Vilhjálmur Örn Vilhjálmsson, 11.7.2013 kl. 23:05]

Gyðingaútrýming hefur verið notuð. Ekki er hægt að kenna þeim um nú. Nú eru Schmidt og Krüger að læra arabísku, og bæta líklega fleiri málum við, nú þegar þeir fá ekki ódýran fisk frá auðtrúa bjánum á Íslandi og þeir þurfa að halda uppi þjóðum sem þeir lokkuðu með inn í útópíuna.

[Gunnar Rögnvaldsson, 12.7.2013 kl. 03:19]

Þakka þér Vilhjálmur og gott að sjá þig hér

Óskabarn Hemlut Schmidts, umfram allt annað, var og er enn ERM (The European Exchange Rate Mechanism). Enginn lét sér meira annt um þetta fyrirbæri frá árinu 1977 en einmitt hann sjálfur; Hemlut Schmidt. Þetta hélt smóknum og vonum hans gangandi. Og líklega krafðist keðjureykinga.

Á tímabili þegar allt útlit var fyrir að ERM-bakstur Schmidts myndi þrátt fyrir allt líklega ekki ala af sér hið fyrirhugaða EMU (The Economic and Monetary Union) er vandræðagangurinn í ERM-pyntingarklefa Evrópusambandsins árin 1991-1993 var hve mestur, vegna einmitt þess skrímslis sem ERM í eðli sínu var og er enn sem hinn fyrsti-fasi-af-þrem til evruupptöku, þá létu þýskir valdhafar sig dreyma um að hægt væri bara að dusta rykið af áætlanagerð þýska fjármálaráðuneytisins frá 1941 —sem jú hafði margsannað getu sína á Gyðingum— og að þeir myndu einfaldlega fá "a hard DM-zone yfir evru. Að þýska markið (DM) myndi verða tekið upp, en ekki evran.

Kveðjur til þín

Gunnar 

Tacit misunderstanding

 

The authorities of France itself fell unwontedly silent during their period of jockeying for position on the future of the ERM. Trichet's main concern was not to rock the boat. Thus, while he continued to insist on the responsibility of all countries to give priority to the 'common good', he rather obviously interpreted this 'common good' as an obligation for Germany to adapt its policies to French needs and for all other countries to avoid exchange-rate developments that affected French competitiveness adversely.

 

There was one implication of the French position, however, that could not be masked yet was unacceptable to the Bundesbank. The French government's determination to avoid a franc devaluation, come what may, signalled that it considered the ERM a fixed-rate régime, the de facto monetary union now condemned as dangerous illusion by both Tietmeyer and Schlesinger. For the Bundesbank, monetary union could proceed only if the conditions laid down by the Maastricht Treaty were satisfied and the degree of political union required to create a 'community of solidarity' achieved. Schlesinger may well have hoped that this meant never, perhaps preferring instead a OM-zone, probably along the lines of the 1941 Economics Ministry plan. For Tietmeyer, the problem was that a de facto monetary union would imply a de facto political union. But a de facto union would be one within an unchanged institutional structure. It would therefore be unacceptable to German political and public opinion. Kohl could support the franc only as long as it was not too politically costly - in terms either of his own European aims or of public opinion - to do so. The point of defending the franc was to avoid derailing a process whose momentum would lead to the right sort of political union: one whose institutional structure would enshrine German dominance in the Community, thus allowing it to pursue its objectives in Central and Eastern Europe by leading Western Europe. (3)

 

Conceding de facto monetary union to France now would totally alter the dynamics of the integration process. It would allow France to avoid the institutional change both desired by Kohl and demanded by German public opinion as a quid pro quo for relinquishing German monetary authority.

 

(3) Tietmeyer had given a remarkable insight into his own preoccupations as early as the end of 1989, shortly after Kohl had put forward his ten-point plan - soon overtaken by events - for eventual German unification. At an international gathering of monetary officials, when someone said that the DDR would soon be known as 'eastern Germany' rather than 'East Germany', Tietmeyer tartly remarked that many Germans regarded the DDR as 'central' Germany (at that time, Kohl was showing signs of being one of the many apparently reluctant to accept the German-Polish frontier as definitive).

 

 

Tekið frá blaðsíðum 284 til 285 í bókinni "The Rotten Heart of Europe", eftir Bernard Connolly - og sem frá Faber and Faber í London og Boston kom út árið 1996 (sjá; Euro-court outlaws criticism of EU)

 

[Gunnar Rögnvaldsson, 12.7.2013 kl. 03:30]

 

Takið vinsamlegast eftir "10 punkta áætluninni" og svo um þann "confederatvie structure" => tvö ríki en í ríkjasambandi => sem Kohl talar um við forsteta Bandaríkjanna þarna þegar DDR var að hrynja

[Gunnar Rögnvaldsson, 12.7.2013 kl. 10:59]

Já . . 

Rétt er að geta þess að skjámyndin hér að ofan er úr skjali (98274F4C2C674738AE33D0164DCA4DEE) yfir samræður Helmut Kohls kanslara Vestur-Þýskalands og George H. W. Bush forseta Bandaríkjanna og sem nú hefur verið "declassified" og situr vel í skjalasafni frú Margrétar Thatchers á The Margaret Thatcher Foundation: http://www.margaretthatcher.org/

Gott er að frú Margaret Thatcher skildi eftir sig heilt haf af upplýsingum sem annars væru kannski ófáanlegar

Kveðjur

[Vilhjálmur Örn Vilhjálmsson, 12.7.2013 kl. 11:17]

Þakka þér fyrir þessar upplýsingar, sem ég kannaðist ekki við. Ég ætla að skoða skjalasafni Thatchers við tækifæri. Þarna ef mikill fróðleikur.